Looks like Indonesia has rejected divisive identity politics

Incumbent President Joko Widodo is leading Prabowo Subianto with a larger margin than in 2014, an affirmation of Indonesians’ support for his moderate agenda, says ISEAS-Yusof Ishak’s Norshahril Saat and Najib Burhani.

Indonesia's President Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma'ruf Amin react after a quick count result during the Indonesian elections in Jakarta, Indonesia April 17, 2019. REUTERS/Edgar Su

SINGAPORE: Going by the quick count results thus far, Indonesia’s incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his running mate Ma’ruf Amin look set to win the headline race.

Official results on this largest-ever, one-day national exercise, involving 192.8 million registered voters will only be declared in May.

Still, early figures show the Jokowi-Ma’ruf pairing securing about 7.8 to 10.6 percentage points more than their challengers, Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, according to at least five pollsters.

What this means is that Jokowi may win by a larger margin than in 2014, when he last faced Prabowo and won by a slimmer 6.3 percentage points. The president looks set to leave this election with a stronger mandate from the people.

While many observers on this election predicted that identity politics will divide Indonesia society, it seems voters have rejected this notion.

Will there be a challenge mounted to dispute these results? These quick counts are consistent with survey results conducted before the election. 

However, Prabowo has already disputed these unofficial results, claiming he has won the race.

IN JAVA, JOKOWI-MA’RUF DID BETTER THAN EXPECTED

Like any other Indonesian presidential elections, winning the hearts and minds of voters in Java, home to more than half of Indonesia’s 261 million-strong population, is key. This is where Jokowi and Ma’ruf are surprisingly performing better in many areas than predicted.

For example, in Jakarta, Jokowi and Prabowo are going toe-to-toe in the polls, even though many had expected Prabowo would easily trounce the incumbent president there.

The capital has seen divisive identity politics played up by the opposition camp for years. In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, politicians used the race and religious cards to discredit and defeat incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), Jokowi’s ally.

 

Muslim hardline protesters cover their faces as police fire tear gas during a protest against Ahok in Jakarta. (Photo: REUTERS)

Jokowi is also winning in areas he was expected to win, such as in East Java, with 66 per cent of the vote. 

It looks like Ma’ruf’s presence in the Jokowi camp may have made the difference, as it helped mobilise Islamic boarding schools affiliated to the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to support the president, especially in East Java, NU’s stronghold.

Ma’ruf’s entry as Jokowi’s running mate may not have been popular with Jokowi’s more moderate supporters, but his position as head of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), the country’s top clerical umbrella body may have shored up the top man’s religious credentials.

As predicted, Jokowi won with a very big margin of about 77 per cent in Central Java, his party PDI-P’s stronghold.

Even Prabowo’s and Sandiaga’s gains in West Java, the battleground of the election with one of the largest and most conservative population, where they are winning about 60 per cent of the votes, could not offset the setbacks suffered.

The results in Java alone may not determine the results. Prabowo and Sandiaga are expected to do better in Sumatra, where they are banking on high voter turnout to negate losses. In West Sumatra, for instance, Prabowo is winning about 85 per cent of the votes.

The official results will be worth watching.

Joko Widodo (right) and Prabowo Subianto during the 2014 presidential election campaign. (Photo: AFP/ROMEO GACAD)

A REJECTION OF IDENTITY POLITICS

Hardline groups seemed to have failed in undermining Jokowi’s popularity and electability across most parts of Indonesia.

Even at the polling station closest to scholar Habib Rizieq Syihab’s home in Petamburan, Jakarta, which serves as the headquarters for the Islamist group Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a group that led those massive protests against Ahok two years ago, Jokowi swept almost all votes by winning 225 votes with Prabowo receiving only 5 votes.

Clearly, conservative groups behind the Prabowo-Sandi team have not been able to replicate their success in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

If Jokowi wins, he will have less to worry about dealing with such elements, a segment that has continuously sought to discredit him by accusing him of not being religious enough.

Indonesia's President Joko Widodo (centre) and his running mate Ma'ruf Amin (3rd left) walk during a peace declaration for the upcoming general election campaign at the National Monument in Jakarta on Sep 23, 2018. (Adek BERRY/AFP) 

WHEN THE MODERATES WIN

If these early poll results hold, what this means is that the country’s narrative on religion and identity has been seized back by the moderates. NU has been the face of moderate Islam for a long time and has been a powerful ally to the winning pair.

Jokowi’s and Ma’ruf’s victory may mean NU becoming an integral part of the government, with the organisation holding huge political sway. It helps that Ma’ruf is the spiritual guide of the organisation, apart from being the chairman of the MUI.

The upside is that it will be hard to criticise the new government on religious grounds, since they have the NU’s backing.

The danger is that NU could become the single-most most dominant force on religious issues. The question is whether they will exercise the same religious tolerance towards other forms of Islam and allow for a plurality of practices and beliefs, with this newfound unspoken monopoly.

It was the Nahdlatul Ulama's tradition that brought me back to reality,” Tsauri shared. (Photo: AFP/Adek Berry) 

Moderate Indonesians will also be watching whether Jokowi’s larger win will lead him down the path of strongman politics and what he will do to protect human rights. 

When the president passed a ban on radical groups in 2017, many were concerned the move could potentially muffle civil society groups. 

UNITY AND GRACE

The mood for the Jokowi camp may be jubilant for now. Jokowi and Ma’ruf have a chance to help reconcile Indonesian society, once polarised into two distinct opposing camps, and try to heal fresh wounds opened up by a bitterly fought political rivalry during these elections.

In his speech after the election, Jokowi has started to call on Indonesians to reunite. He will no doubt need the help of Prabowo, who has yet to concede defeat, to show graciousness and call for national solidarity in any eventual concession speech.

Norshahril Saat is Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and Co-coordinator of the Indonesian Studies Programme. Najib Burhani is Visiting Fellow at the same institute.

Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/indonesia-elections-results-identity-politics-prabowo-jokowi-11457160

Menjaga Persaudaraan Kebangsaan

Kompas, 16 April 2019

AHMAD NAJIB BURHANI 

Dalam sambutan- nya pada Pembukaan Munas Alim Ulama dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama di Kota Banjar (27/2/2019), Presiden Joko Widodo mengingatkan pentingnya menjaga persaudaraan kebangsaan.

Diungkapkan, ”Ukhuwah dan persaudaraan adalah hal yang sangat penting, baik itu ukhuwah islamiah[persaudaraan sesama Muslim], ukhuwah wathoniyah [persaudaraan sesama anak bangsa], ukhuwah insaniyah [persaudaraan kemanusiaan], penting semuanya… pada kesempatan yang baik ini, saya titip… saya titip… jangan sampai karena urusan [yang paling bawah] pemilihan bupati, naik lagi, urusan pemilihan gubernur… kemudian naik lagi urusan pilpres… kita ini tidak merasa sebagai saudara sebangsa dan setanah air… hati-hati kalau sudah ada rasa seperti itu… saya mengajak kepada kita semuanya untuk menjaga ukhuwah kita, ukhuwah islamiah kita, ukhuwah wathoniyah kita”.

Logika perang

Apa yang disampaikan Presiden itu sangat relevan dengan kondisi di masyarakat menjelang pemilu yang dilangsungkan pada 17 April 2019. Narasi perang banyak bertebaran, baik di media sosial maupun kampanye untuk mendukung calon presiden dan wakil presiden tertentu. Istilah perang badar, perang total, dan perang ideologi menjadi term yang terus-menerus mengisi otak dan telinga masyarakat.

Demikian juga politics of fear atau bayangan tentang ancaman akan terjadinya hal-hal buruk jika kubunya kalah. Kubu A menakut-nakuti akan adanya legalisasi perkawinan sejenis, pelarangan azan, kriminalisasi ulama, dan ancaman Islam liberal jika lawannya menang.

Kubu B menyebut akan ada larangan tahlilan, penggusuran kuburan, dan Talibanisasi Indonesia jika kubu lawan menang. Pendeknya, masa depan Islam dan negara menjadi taruhan dalam pilpres kali ini.

Ketika Jokowi memilih Ma’ruf Amin sebagai calon wakil presidennya 10 Agustus 2018, banyak yang berpikir bahwa politik identitas tak akan dipakai lagi dalam pemilu ini. Ini dilandasi pemikiran bahwa Ma’ruf Amin, sebagai Rais AmSyuriah PBNU dan Ketua Umum Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), bisa menjadi tameng terhadap berbagai serangan dengan menggunakan politik identitas, terutama agama.

Atau bahkan orang akan enggan dan berhenti sama sekali dengan politisasi simbol-simbol dan bahasa agama. Selanjutnya, para politisi akan beralih ke isu lingkungan, hak asasi manusia (HAM), dan terutama ekonomi. Logika ini terlihat masuk akal, terlebih dengan dipilihnya Sandiaga Uno sebagai pasangan dari Prabowo Subianto.

Meski demikian, dalam perjalanannya, penggunaan politik identitas tetap atau semakin kuat. Bahkan, pilpres kali ini dalam bahasa yang dipakai oleh beberapa orang dari tim pemenangan kedua kubu sering diistilahkan sebagai jihad dan pertaruhan antara hidup dan mati. Amien Rais menggunakan istilah ”partai Allah vs partai setan”, ada pula sebutan ”partai penista agama vs partai pendusta agama”.

Farhat Abbas mengklaim yang ”pilih Jokowi masuk surga; yang enggak, masuk neraka”, dan dalam Malam Munajat 212 bulan lalu (21/2), Neno Warisman mengadu kepada Allah bahwa ”tak ada lagi yang menyembah-Mu [Allah]” jika kubu yang didukungnya kalah.

Bedanya dari Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017, kali ini tidak digunakan istilah ”Muslim vs kafir”, tetapi lebih sebagai pertarungan antara yang ”Islami vs lebih Islami”, ”moderat vs radikal”, dan bahkan ada yang menyebut ”NU vs eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)”.

Logika dan term perang dan permusuhan antara hak dan batil seperti menjadi bagian yang tak terpisahkan dari politik. Banyak dari para politisi sadar bahwa istilah-istilah itu digunakan semata demi merebut kekuasaan saja. Sedihnya, kesadaran seperti itu kadang tidak sampai ke masyarakat luas.

Mereka memakan mentah-mentah jargon-jargon pertarungan politik itu dan melihatnya sebagai sesuatu yang harus dibela mati-matian atau sebagai jihad. Banyak dari mereka yang lupa bahwa para politisi itu, meminjam istilah Aditya Pratama (2019), ”sangat bisa berubah, terlebih bila menyangkut urusan duniawi. Lidah mereka tiba-tiba bisa saja bercabang, dan wajahnya atau kulitnya dapat berubah sewaktu-waktu”.

Jalan pintas

Politik itu ganas, kejam, tetapi sekaligus sangat menggoda dan menggiurkan. Tidak sedikit politisi, artis, dan bahkan ulama yang rela menjadi setan asalkan kekuasaan politik bisa tergenggam. Dalam bahasa Amien Rais dalam Tanwir Muhammadiyah 2017, kekuasaan politik itu seperti ”jalan tol, jalan supercepat tanpa penghalang” yang bisa mengantarkan pemegangnya menuju surga jannatun na’im atau menuju neraka jahanam.

Ia bisa menjadi jalan pintas untuk menjadi kaya dan mendapat akses ekonomi. Ia bisa menjadi sarana untuk membuat hegemoni, monopoli, dan diskriminasi sebagai sesuatu yang legal. Namun, ia juga menjadi jalan untuk menegakkan keadilan dan kesejahteraan.

Di Indonesia ini, tragisnya, politik itu sepertinya lebih banyak menjadi jalan menuju neraka. Berdasarkan survei yang dilakukan SMRC (2017) dan LSI (2018), lembaga politik yang bernama Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) dan partai politik merupakan institusi yang paling rendah mendapat kepercayaan dari publik.

Lantas kenapa kita banyak terbawa oleh logika-logika perang mereka dan begitu mengikuti apa yang mereka katakan dalam pemilu kali ini?

Semoga kita bisa tetap menjaga persaudaraan dalam tahun politik ini. Semoga, seusai pemilu yang kebetulan bulan Ramadhan dan Idul Fitri, kita bisa membenahi kembali sendi-sendi kesatuan bangsa yang mengalami retak dan semua permusuhan dan kebencian bisa dihapuskan.

Ahmad Najib Burhani Peneliti Senior di Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI)

https://kompas.id/baca/opini/2019/04/16/menjaga-persaudaraan-kebangsaan/

Nahdlatul Ulama and the Framing of an Ideological Battle in the 2019 Indonesian Elections

ISEAS Commentary, 2019/26, 7 March 2019

At a seminar organised on 25 Feb 2019 by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Yenny Zannuba Wahid of the Wahid Foundation described a divide in Indonesia’s Islamic landscape in the context of the forthcoming 2019 presidential elections.

The divide is animated by two different ideological leanings supported by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and certain Islamist groups, particularly the banned Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir (HTI), respectively. The former is against the establishment of a caliphate, the adoption of syariah as positive law in Indonesia, the implementation of religion-based by-laws, and staunchly supports the principles of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia).   In contrast, the latter champions the implementation of syariah law in Indonesia, transforming it into “NKRI Bersyariah”, and some of them even support the Islamic caliphate.

The NU believes that the Islamist groups, including the ex-HTI, are supporting and operating within the Prabowo camp.  It sees Hasyim Djojohadikusumo’s (Prabowo’s brother and founding member of Gerindra) statement that the Gerindra Party and Prabowo’s camp welcome any group to join them, including ex-HTI and ex-communist party (PKI) members, as indicative of that position.

In framing this election as an ideological battle, NU has been “cancut tali wondo” (fully and actively involved) in supporting Joko Widodo’s camp. The NU believes that more than just a regular election is at stake this time round, including Pancasila (the Indonesia state ideology that supports pluralism) and what is known as moderate Islam. In other words, there is fear that Joko Widodo’s loss could lead to the transformation of Indonesia into NKRI Bersyariah, or the government would implement an exclusive Pancasila, giving particular emphasis to the first pillar, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (Believe in Only One God).

NKRI Bersyariah implies that all regulations in this “Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia” must comply with Syariah law. Furthermore, implementing an exclusive Pancasila would mean promoting orthodoxy to the point of not tolerating Penghayat Kepercayaan (native faith follower) and those that are considered deviant sects, like the Ahmadiyah and Syiah.

Besides the issue of the ideological battle, NU has also thrown its full support behind Joko Widodo because of the incumbent’s decision to choose Ma’ruf Amin, former rois ‘am (supreme leader) of NU, as his running mate. For NU, as both Hasyim Muzadi (former chairman of the NU) and Salahuddin Wahid (former president Abdurrahman Wahid’s brother and an influential leader of the NU) had lost previously as vice-presidential candidates, the stakes are high.  It would be catastrophic for NU’s standing to suffer a third loss.

What remains unclear is whether NU members are more likely to support Joko Widodo because of the ideological framing, or because they want to see Ma’ruf Amin become vice president. If it is the former, that will have a more deeply polarising effect on Indonesia’s Islamic landscape. If it is the latter, there is a certain degree of dissonance because Ma’ruf Amin used to be part of the groups that are now attacking Joko Widodo.

Dr Ahmad Najib Burhani is Visiting Fellow with ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.

The facts and views expressed are solely that of the author/authors and do not necessarily reflect that of ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.  No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission.

https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/9191-nahdlatul-ulama-and-the-framing-of-an-ideological-battle-in-the-2019-indonesian-elections-by-ahmad-najib-burhani